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AN ADVOCATE’S TOOLKIT: USING CRIMINAL
“THEFT OF SERVICE” LAWS TO ENFORCE
WORKERS’ RIGHT TO BE PAID
Rita J. Verga*
OVERVIEW
This toolkit is intended to be an accessible guide1 for non-lawyer advo-
cates assisting day laborers and other contingent workers to recover unpaid
wages.  It details a new tactic which uses criminal “theft of service” laws to
hold employers accountable for failing to pay wages.  This tactic will be most
feasible for community groups that have an established relationship with
law enforcement officials, and for those that can mount a campaign to pres-
sure law enforcement officials to implement the approach.
The toolkit introduces “theft of service” laws, sets forth reasons why
new wage enforcement tactics are needed, discusses issues that will arise if
advocates attempt to use “theft of service” laws, describes legislative efforts to
have “theft of service” laws passed at the local level, and proposes a way to
improve wage theft laws.  It also includes four Appendices with a detailed
breakdown of applicable laws, and sample forms and letters which I hope
will serve as helpful guides and provide necessary information.
As a final note, I hope that criminal prosecution of the egregious em-
ployer practice of stealing workers’ wages will help to end the general accept-
ance of robbing low-wage workers.
I. INTRODUCTION TO “THEFT OF SERVICE” LAWS
Although numerous legal tools exist to enforce workers’ right
to be paid, studies and anecdotal evidence demonstrate that non-
payment of wages2 is a major and continuing problem for day la-
borers.3  This paper aims to describe a promising new tactic which
* J.D. 2005, City University of New York School of Law.  This piece was produced
during an externship at the National Employment Law Project.  I thank all of the
worker advocates who contributed information and comments to this article, includ-
ing Chris Newman, Julien Ross, Cathy Ruckelshaus, and Amy Sugimori.
1 This guide is formatted to suit the law review style and layout.
2 As used in this guide, “non-payment of wages” includes complete non-payment
of wages for work performed, as well as partial payment of wages where the amount
paid is less than the amount that was promised.  The term “wage theft” is also used to
refer to non-payment of wages.  As it is generally used, “wage theft” encompasses a
wider range of practices than non-payment of wages, including failure to pay
overtime.
3 See ABEL VALENZUELA JR. & EDWIN MELÉNDEZ, NEW SCHOOL UNIV. & UCLA, DAY
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uses existing criminal “theft of service” laws against employers who
fail to pay wages.  Thirty-three states’ criminal codes include a
“theft of service” provision4 which could be used to prosecute em-
ployers for wage theft.5  Though it is unclear what particular con-
LABOR IN NEW YORK: FINDINGS FROM THE NYDL SURVEY 1, 10 (2003) (indicating that 50
percent of the New York City sample experienced complete non-payment of wages,
and that 56 percent were paid less than was agreed); Abel Valenzuela Jr., Day Laborers
in Southern California: Preliminary Findings from the Day Labor Survey vi, 4, 14 (1999)
(indicating that about 50 percent of the Los Angeles and Orange County area sample
experienced complete non-payment of wages, and finding that non-payment and pay
less than agreed were the most common work-place abuses experienced by day labor-
ers); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE PROTECTIONS FOR
DAY LABORERS COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE, Pub. No. 02-925, at
14, 15 n.26 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02925.pdf (indicat-
ing that the majority of interviewed nonprofit and government agencies reported that
day laborers complained weekly about non-payment of wages, and that researchers
reported that over 50 percent of day laborers are not paid the wages that they are
owed) (citing DAN KERR & CHRIS DOLE, CHALLENGING EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: A
STUDY OF THE DAY LABOR INDUSTRY IN CLEVELAND (2001)); NATIONAL DAY LABOR OR-
GANIZING NETWORK, ET AL., COMMON GROUND 5-6 at http://www.ndlon.org/re-
search.htm/commongroundreport-Eng.doc (indicating that one of the most
pervasive complaints among the survey sample was employers’ failure to pay workers
the promised wages) (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
4 Most “theft of service” provisions are codified independently from conventional
“theft” (of property) laws. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10 (1974); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200
(Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802(A)(6) (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-36-104(a)(1) (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(7) (West Supp.
2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 845 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-5 (2003); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/16-3(a) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3704(a) (1995); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 514.060(1) (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 357(1) (West 1964
& Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(2)(13) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-6-305 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-515 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. 205.0832(1)(f)
(2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:8 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-8 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.125 (2003);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3926 (West 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-30A-8 (Michie
1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-104 (2003 & Supp. 2004); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.04 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-409 (2003); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2582 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.020 (West 2000); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24 (Michie 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-408(a) (Michie 2003).
However, some “theft of service” provisions are incorporated within conventional
“theft” laws. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 2000) (defines the crime of “theft” to
include “knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pre-
tense, defraud[ing] any other person of money, labor or real or personal property
. . .”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3211(c) (2001) (defines the crime of “theft” to include
theft of property in the form of services); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-830(4) (Supp. 2003)
(defines the crime of “theft” to include obtaining services by deception); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 714.1(3) (West 2003) (defines the crime of “theft” to include “obtain[ing] the
labor or services of another . . . by deception . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 18-2403 (Michie
Supp. 2003) (defines the crime of “theft” to include the theft of property or services);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (Anderson 2004) (same).
5 It is possible to use “theft of service” laws to prosecute employers because almost
all such laws explicitly define “service” to include “labor.” See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-
10(b) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1801 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-118
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duct “theft of service” statutes were originally enacted to deter,6
they were probably intended to fill the gap created by conventional
“theft” and “larceny” laws, which require that defendants have sto-
len “property.”7  What is clear is that “theft of service” laws have
been liberally amended and used to address a number of disparate
problems, from evading bus fare to leaving a hotel without paying.8
This history of flexible adaptation creates potential for the inter-
pretation of “theft of service” laws to adjust to the wage theft issues
posed by the day labor work arrangement.
(2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 847 (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3201(5) (2004);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.010 (Michie 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(1)(9) (West
2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.0829 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(6) (Vernon
2004).  However, two states do not define “services” at all (ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.990
(Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-1 (2003)), and one state does not explicitly in-
clude labor within the definition of services (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-408(d) (Michie
2003) (“‘services’ includes, but is not limited to, electric, telephone, cable television,
gas, water or sewer services”)).  Thus, in these three states it is unclear whether “theft
of service” laws could be used to prosecute employers for unpaid wages.  Advocates in
these states might consider legislative campaigns to define “services” or to amend the
definition of “services” to explicitly include “labor.”  Interestingly, although New York
defines “service” to include labor, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(8) (McKinney 1998), New
York’s “theft of service” law is so specifically targeted at theft and attempted theft of
certain kinds of services that it could not be used to prosecute wage theft. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 2004).
6 But see Julien Ross, A Fair Day’s Pay: The Problem of Unpaid Workers in Central Texas,
10 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 117, 144 (Fall 2004) (“The concept of theft of service was
drafted mainly to protect workers and employers in industries such as restaurant, taxi,
or hotel, where services are rendered and compensation is expected upon completion
of the services.”).
7 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 2004).  Generally, “service” and
“labor” are not included in the definition of “property.” See, e.g., id. § 31.01(5). See
generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Is “Property of Another” Within Statute
Proscribing Larceny, Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of Another, 2002 A.L.R. 5th 19, avail-
able at 2002 WL 31202778 (collecting and analyzing cases in which courts have consid-
ered the question of what constitutes “property of another”).
8 See, e.g., Tex. House Infrastructure Dev. and Sec. Comm. Rep. on Tex. H.B.
2500, 78th Leg. (May 22, 2003) (Dallas peace officers “conduct fare inspections and
issue [‘theft of service’] citations to individuals who do not show proof of payment to
use bus or rail services”); Tex. Senate Criminal Jurisprudence Comm. Rep. on Tex.
S.B. 437, 77th Leg. (May 16, 2001) (“theft of service” law amended to address the
problem of hotel guests who pay a deposit for a one-night stay, then extend their stay
for additional days and leave without paying for the additional days); H.P. 711, 117th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (“theft of services” law amended to include theft of
cellular telephone services); H.B. 3081, 99th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tn. 1995);
H.B. 469, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004) (A current Kentucky bill would amend
“theft of services” to include failure to pay for child care.). See also Benjamin D. Kern,
Whacking, Joyriding and War-driving: Roaming Use of Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 148-51 (2004) (discussing “theft of service” laws’
application to using unencrypted Wi-Fi network connections to the Internet without
the approval of the network’s operator).
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II. WHY A NEW TACTIC IS NEEDED: LACK OF ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL AND STATE WAGE PROTECTION LAWS
The use of criminal “theft of service” laws is not meant to be a
panacea.  Rather it is one of the tools that workers can use to col-
lect unpaid wages.  Other tools include the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA)9 and state labor code provisions.  However, both
of these methods have serious drawbacks.10  Enforcement of the
federal FLSA is through one of two paths.  The first generally in-
volves an employee making a complaint to the Wage and Hour Di-
vision of the United States Department of Labor (DOL).11  The
DOL decides whether to conduct an investigation and makes a de-
termination as to whether an employer has violated the FLSA.12  If
the DOL so determines, it may seek enforcement of the FLSA by
filing a civil suit.13  As commentators and advocates have noted,
enforcement by the DOL is hampered by a lack of both resources
and political will to investigate low-wage workers’ claims.14  Moreo-
ver, when the DOL does bring a claim, the Agency, not the em-
ployee, has complete control over the course of the litigation,
including the right to make decisions as to whether to settle a
claim and for how much.  The second method of enforcing the
9 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
10 In addition to the problems with enforcement discussed in this Section, many
low-wage workers simply are not covered by the FLSA.  Most employees of businesses
that do not put goods into the stream of interstate commerce and have less than
$500,000 in gross revenues a year are exempt from the requirements of the FLSA.  29
U.S.C.A. § 203(s)(1).  Nonetheless, it should be noted that undocumented workers
are covered by the FLSA and state minimum wage laws. E.g., Singh v. Jutla & C.D. &
R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058-59 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that un-
documented workers continue to be “employees” covered by the FLSA).
11 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, 1 EMP. L. DESKBOOK HUM. RESOURCES PROF. § 6:73 (2004);
4 WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE AND PRACTICE DB19:20. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, PUB. NO. HEHS-95-29, GARMENT INDUSTRY: EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PREV-
ALENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SWEATSHOPS 3 (1994), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1995/he95029.pdf (finding that in the garment industry the DOL “typically
targets workplaces for inspection based on complaints received from workers and
other sources”).
12 See LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, 2 WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE AND
PRACTICE § 19:2 (2004) (summarizing the criteria used by the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion to select employers for investigation).
13 E.g., LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, 2 WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE
AND PRACTICE § 19:10 (2004) (outlining the Wage and Hour Division’s options when
it has found violations of the Act, which include taking no action, settling the matter
with the employer, notifying the employees of their private right of action, referring
the file for litigation, or closing the file after unsuccessful attempts at settlement).
14 See JENNIFER GORDON, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE UNPAID WAGES PROHIBITION ACT: LATINO IMMIGRANTS CHANGE NEW YORK
WAGE LAW 3-4 (1999), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/PDF/imp_wp4gordon.
pdf [hereinafter GORDON, CAMPAIGN FOR UNPAID WAGES]; Ross, supra note 6, at 156.
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FLSA involves employees filing civil suits without the intervention
of the DOL.15  When an employee brings a FLSA claim s/he is re-
sponsible for the costs of litigation and potentially liable for attor-
ney fees if s/he is not successful in the lawsuit.16  Although free
legal services organizations handle some wage enforcement cases,
budget limitations prohibit them from helping most workers.17
Furthermore, federally funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
entities are restricted from representing undocumented workers,
who constitute a growing number of low-wage day laborers and
contingent workers.18
In addition to the federal FLSA, almost every state deals with
non-payment of wages in its state labor laws.  Like their federal
counterparts, the state agencies charged with enforcing labor laws
are understaffed, have very limited investigative resources, and gen-
erally lack the political will to assist low-wage workers.19  It should
15 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
16 See id.
17 A survey of selected Legal Service Corporation-funded programs in 1993, when
LSC funding was substantially higher, disclosed that nearly one-half of all individuals
applying for legal services were unable to be helped because of limited program re-
sources.  A recent survey indicates that an estimated 80 percent of financially eligible
clients are unable to obtain necessary legal assistance.  Legal Services Corporation,
Serving the Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans: A Special Report to Congress 13 (Apr.
30, 2000), at http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/EXSUM.pdf.  A number of legal needs assess-
ments have been undertaken nationally and in various states.  They document the
unmet need for legal services of low-income as well as moderate-income individuals.
See, e.g., Lonnie Powers, Legal Needs Studies and Public Funding for Legal Services: One
State’s Partial Success, 101 DICK. L. REV. 587, 587-90 (1997). See also Jennifer Gordon,
We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for
Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 422 (1995) (describing the dearth of
employment-related services at legal services organizations).
18 The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(18), 110 Stat. 1321, 50 (1996) (codified in various sections of
titles 18, 20, 28, and 42 of the United States Code). This Act restricts attorneys receiv-
ing Legal Services Corporation funds from serving most undocumented immigrants.
Under this law, attorneys receiving federal funds for legal services are required to
check the immigration status of potential clients and to deny services to virtually all
undocumented immigrants.  All federal funds are withdrawn from any attorney who
persists in serving undocumented immigrants.  Phillip Gallagher, LSC Restriction Fact
Sheet #4: The Restriction Barring Legal Services Corporation-Funded Lawyers from Assisting
Aliens, at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheet_aliens.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005).
19 See GORDON, CAMPAIGN FOR UNPAID WAGES, supra note 14, at 4-6 (describing the
New York State Department of Labor’s systematic under-enforcement of wage and
hour violations and unresponsiveness to immigrant workers’ complaints). See also
LIMOR BAR-COHEN & DEANA MILAM CARRILLO, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE
FOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 1970-2000, 135
(2002).  This 2002 study of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
(DLSE), the state agency charged with enforcing California’s wage and labor stan-
dards, found that its budget and staffing allocations have not kept pace with the
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be noted that many of the existing state labor laws dealing with
non-payment of wages contain overlapping administrative, civil,
and criminal penalty provisions.20  However, the criminal penalties
are rarely imposed.21  Nonetheless, advocates should be aware that
labor laws, criminal laws, and even city ordinances may be used to
the advantage of workers.
For all these reasons, enforcement of federal and state wage
and hour laws is challenging.  Despite the difficulty with enforce-
growth in the size of the state’s workforce, nor with the agency’s increased responsibil-
ities. Id.  The study also found that several key activity measures, such as the number
of investigations, citations, and penalties assessed, have failed to increase in propor-
tion to the expansion of funding and staffing that has occurred. Id.
20 State labor laws permit simultaneous or successive civil and criminal enforce-
ment actions against violators.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
“protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense” in successive proceedings.  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860,
864 (2d Cir. 1998).  State labor laws that provide criminal penalties for non-payment
of wages include ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.140 (Michie 2002), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-
352 (West 2004), CAL. LAB. CODE § 216(a) (2000), COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-114 (2003),
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-71g (West 2003), D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1011 (2001), HAW.
REV. STAT. § 388-10(b) (Supp. 2003), 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/11(b) (2004), IND.
CODE § 22-2-2-11 (1997), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1210(a) (2000), MD. CODE ANN., LAB.
& EMP., § 3-508(c)(1) (1999), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 27C (2004), MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 408.484 (2001), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 177.32 (West 1993), MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 290.525(8) (West 1993), MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-206 (2003), NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1206(2) (1998), NEV. REV. STAT. 608.290(1) (2003), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:52
(1999), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a22 (West 1991), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-10 (Michie
1978 & Supp. 2000), N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198-a, 213 (McKinney 2002), N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-25.21(c) (2003), N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-19 (2004), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4113.99 (West 2005), OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.8 (2004), 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.11a (West 2004), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-17 (2003), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-
15 (Michie 1993), TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-103 (2004), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 61.019
(Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005), UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-12 (2001), VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 345 (2003), VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(E) (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2004),
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.48.020 (West 2002), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5C-7 (Michie
2002), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.11(3) (West 2002).
21 For example, The Workplace Project’s 1997 “Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act,”
signed by New York Governor Pataki following lobbying efforts coordinated with the
Chinese Staff and Workers’ Association and the Latino Workers’ Center, makes re-
peat or willful non-payment or underpayment of wages a criminal felony.  1997 N.Y.
Laws 605. Much of the momentum behind the bill came from the Project’s analysis of
its 900-person database, which documented the Department of Labor’s lack of atten-
tion to claims brought by low-wage workers. See GORDON, CAMPAIGN FOR UNPAID
WAGES, supra note 14, at 5.  The Act, if enforced, would levy extremely tough penalties
against employers owing wages. However, to date, no employers have been prose-
cuted under this law. E-mail from Nadia Marin-Molina, Executive Director, The
Workplace Project (Oct. 7, 2004, 16:34:33 EST) (on file with author). In addition,
although Colorado’s labor law provides criminal penalties, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-
114, advocates report that it has never been enforced.  Katherine Michienzi, Modern
Day Slavery: Unpaid Wages to Immigrant Day Laborers in the U.S. and Colorado 42
(2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Denver) (on file with author). But see,
e.g., infra note 59.
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ment, attempts to use criminal laws to enforce wage theft claims
appear few and far between.22  Even so, there are several good rea-
sons why criminal laws should be used.  The formal use of the
“criminal” label and informal societal perceptions about the penal
character of particular actions have important consequences for
the kind of social stigma associated with behaviors.23  Criminal
charges often have a shaming function and result in negative pub-
licity.  Relatedly, local law enforcement’s heightened involvement
in wage claim cases may deter employers from cheating workers.24
As former Austin Police Department (APD) Commander Juan
Gonzalez has stated, “I think the threat of APD has already made
some employers pay up.”25
In addition to a heightened deterrent effect, another benefit
of using criminal theft laws is that government attorneys instead of
private attorneys are the “prosecutors.”  This shifts the costs of en-
forcement from under-funded federal and state agencies and the
working poor to local law enforcement departments.  This strategy
vests discretion about whether to take legal action in the hands of
local police and government prosecutors.26
One drawback to using “theft of service” provisions is that
workers can recover only wages owed, regardless of whether those
wages meet minimum wage or overtime requirements.  In other
words, even if the wages owed to a worker are below the minimum
wage, the worker can only recover the amount that the employer
said s/he would pay.27
22 See, e.g., People v. Vanguard Meter Serv. Inc., 611 N.Y.2d 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
1994); Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting Division of Public Labor: Part 2, NYJL, Jan. 12,
2004, at 3 (col. 1).
23 Some scholars define a crime as “any social harm defined and made punishable
by law.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 1982)).
24 Deterrence occurs on two levels.  First, a recalcitrant employer who has failed to
pay workers might be induced to pay based on the threat of criminal sanction.  Sec-
ond, an employer who considers cheating workers might be dissuaded, particularly if
a campaign has been widely publicized.
25 Lauri Apple, The Theft of Wages is Sin: Fighting For Migrant Workers, AUSTIN
CHRON., Dec. 27, 2002, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/
2002-12-27/pols_feature.html.
26 Reliance on local law enforcement officials may be desirable or a hindrance.
27 Michienzi, supra note 21, at 74. This principle is known as restitution. “The
restitution principle holds that one who violates a duty or commits some wrong ought
to be required to repair any injury she or he has caused.” AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET
AL., CONTRACTING LAW 93 (2d ed. 2000).  Restitution emphasizes the duty to return or
pay for a benefit unjustly retained. Id. at 94. Although the remedy of restitution is
not explicitly provided for in any “theft of service” statutes, many states have enacted
statutes to assist crime victims in the recovery of damages from crimes. See, e.g., TEX.
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Another important consideration in deciding whether to use
“theft of service” laws arises in states that provide criminal penalties
for non-payment of wages within their labor laws.  In such states,
penalties for “theft of service” in criminal codes may differ signifi-
cantly from penalties available in labor codes.28  So, while criminal
“theft of service” laws may serve as an alternative basis for prosecut-
ing unpaid wage cases, it is essential to understand the penalties
under each available law before deciding which route to follow.
Needless to say, it is also necessary to consider the workers’ and the
advocates’ goals in pursuing the case, as well as the likelihood of
enforcement.
A final consideration is that defendants are afforded greater
protections in a criminal action than in a civil action.  For example,
in certain criminal actions defendants have a right to appointed
counsel,29 and the right to jury trial.30  Moreover, criminal prosecu-
tions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas civil claims
must be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.
III. USING “THEFT OF SERVICE” LAWS: EDUCATING AND
COORDINATING WITH AND AMONG POLICE
AND PROSECUTORS
Those considering filing police reports under a criminal “theft
of service” law must coordinate enforcement with and among po-
lice and prosecutors.  The experience of advocates in Austin, Texas
is instructive.
In August 2002, the Austin Police Department (APD) began
investigating cases of unpaid wages as criminal “theft of service.”
Julien Ross, Coordinator of the Equal Justice Center’s Central
Texas Immigrant Workers’ Rights Center (CTIWoRC) or Centro
de Apoyo para Trabajadores Inmigrantes, calls the move “unprece-
CODE CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 42.037(a) (Vernon 2004) (“In addition to any fine
authorized by law, the court that sentences a defendant convicted of an offense may
order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense.”).  See generally
George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled
Under State Criminal Statute, 15 A.L.R. 5th 391 §§ 3, 45(j) (1993 & Supp. 2004) (collect-
ing “theft of service” cases in which restitution and interest were ordered by judges).
28 A noteworthy bill was recently introduced in New Jersey.  It would have
amended the penalty provision of the state’s minimum wage labor law, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 34:11-56a22 (West 1991), to include the harsher penalties that are already availa-
ble under the state’s criminal “theft of service” provision.  2004 New Jersey Senate Bill
No. 584, New Jersey 211th Legislature.
29 Cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no constitutional right to appointed
counsel in misdemeanor case in which no imprisonment is imposed).
30 Cf. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (no constitutional
right to jury trial in prosecution for a “petty offense”).
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dented.”31  He reports that the initiative for using the criminal
“theft of service” statute developed out of regular meetings about
day labor issues which were attended by workers, City of Austin
staff, advocacy organizations, and local police officers.  The prob-
lem of unpaid wages was frequently discussed at these meetings
and Texas’s “theft of service” statute was identified as a potential
enforcement strategy, with the primary challenge being the ability
to prove the employer’s “intent not to pay.”32
Soon after the APD and Travis County Attorney (TCA) agreed
to investigate certain cases of unpaid wages under the “theft of ser-
vice” statute, the CTIWoRC initiated a task force specifically to
monitor and flesh out the new policy.  The task force participants
included workers, and representatives from the CTIWoRC, Catho-
lic Charities, the APD, the TCA, Texas Rural Legal Aid, and the
Mexican Consulate.  The task force developed evidentiary criteria
to establish which circumstances of non-payment would qualify as
“intent not to pay,” and hence when employers could be arrested
for criminal “theft of service.”  Those criteria are now included in
the APD’s manual of standard operating procedure (SOP).33
The experience of San Francisco’s La Raza Centro Legal (La
Raza) underscores the importance of coordinating with police and
systematizing enforcement.  La Raza discussed enforcement of Cal-
ifornia’s “theft of service” law with a local police captain, who ver-
bally agreed to apply the law.  However, the captain did not inform
the officers under his command of the agreement or formalize any
procedures for enforcement in the departmental SOP manual.
When La Raza advocates called in reports, police operators told
them that unpaid wages are “a civil matter” and their reports were
never investigated.34
In Austin, the CTIWoRC now serves as a liaison between po-
lice, prosecutors, and workers.  The affected worker, together with
the CTIWoRC, communicates closely with the APD during the in-
31 Ross, supra note 6, at 145.
32 Telephone Interview with Julien Ross, Coordinator, Central Texas Immigrant
Workers’ Rights Center (Sept. 26, 2004). See discussion infra Section V. & App. A.
33 Telephone Interview with Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 26, 2004).
See infra App. A. See generally Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability:
The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 3, 14-18 (2003) (discussing the role of departmental standard operating proce-
dure manuals in filling the gap between law and practice, confining officers’ discre-
tion, and providing guidance to the front-line workers who make critical decisions in
implementing official policy).
34 Telephone Interview with Hillary Ronen, Attorney, La Raza Centro Legal (Sept.
30, 2004).
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vestigation of the case and subsequently with the Travis County
prosecutor in the event that the employer is arrested.  The worker
and the CTIWoRC convey to the prosecutor what remedy the
worker is seeking - restitution35 and/or prosecution.36  The prose-
cutor then attempts to settle the case with the employer.  Julien
Ross reports that prosecutors have never settled a case for less than
the full amount owed.  When cases do settle, the employer makes a
check payable to the county, and then the county makes out a
check to the worker through the CTIWoRC.37
The Austin task force is still working to achieve adequate train-
ing of APD detectives and TCA prosecutors who will be working on
the “theft of service” cases.  According to CTIWoRC advocates, ef-
fective handling of wage theft cases requires special training on the
nuances of employer-worker relations that may not exist in other
types of theft cases.  The current strategy is to have each of the nine
APD sectors identify one detective who will be assigned to the
cases, which will have the special tagged name of “theft of wages.”
The task force will then hold training sessions with the nine “theft
of wages” detectives.  The task force hopes to implement the same
centralized method to train TCA prosecutors.38
35 See supra note 27.
36 Telephone Interview with Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 26, 2004).
Interestingly, the prosecutors in these cases ask the crime “victims” what relief they
desire.  Note that some states have comprehensive victims’ rights laws that allow vic-
tims to have input into the prosecution’s decision-making process, including consulta-
tion with the district attorney in decisions about entering into plea agreements. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4419 (West 2004) (allowing victims to confer with the
prosecution “about a decision not to proceed with a criminal prosecution, dismissal,
plea or sentence negotiations”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (2004) (allowing vic-
tims to be present at all critical stages of the criminal justice process and “to be heard
at any court proceeding that involves a bond reduction or modification, the accept-
ance of a negotiated plea agreement, or . . . sentencing”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-91c (West Supp. 2004) (allowing victims “to appear before the court for the pur-
pose of making a statement for the record” in support of or in opposition to any plea
agreement); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (Michie Supp. 2003) (allowing victims to be
“[h]eard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of
guilty, sentencing, incarceration, placing on probation or release of the defendant”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k(II) (2001) (allowing victims to consult with prosecu-
tors regarding plea bargaining and to offer victim impact statements during sentenc-
ing proceedings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825(9-a) (2003) (requiring that victims
receive pretrial notification if the prosecutor plans to offer a plea bargain); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 23A-28C-1(5) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2003) (allowing victims “[t]o offer
written input into whether plea bargaining or sentencing bargaining agreements
should be entered into”).
37 Telephone Interview with Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 26, 2004).
38 E-mail from Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with
author).
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IV. USING “THEFT OF SERVICE” LAWS: SHIELDING WORKERS FROM
THE SHARING OF IMMIGRATION STATUS WITH
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES
Although federal and state laws protect workers from wage
theft regardless of their immigration status,39 workers seeking the
assistance of law enforcement rightly fear that such contact could
result in the sharing of information related to immigration status
with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or INS).40  It is critical
that advocates ensure that any police department handling wage
theft complaints has a formal rule regarding non-enforcement of
immigration law before undocumented workers contact law en-
forcement officials.  The absence of such a rule inevitably silences
immigrant crime victims and witnesses, and impedes police efforts
to win the trust and confidence of the communities they serve.41
Moreover, “[i]mmigrants will decline to report crimes or suspi-
39 See, e.g., WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FACT SHEET #48: APPLICATION
OF U.S. LABOR LAWS TO IMMIGRANT WORKERS: EFFECT OF Hoffman Plastics decision on
laws enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (n.d.), available at http://www.dol.gov/
esa/regs/compliance/whd/whdfs48.htm (“The Department’s Wage and Hour Divi-
sion will continue to enforce the FLSA and [Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act] without regard to whether an employee is documented or
undocumented.”).
40 “In June of 2002 Attorney General Ashcroft adopted a new policy that allows
state and local police to arrest and detain certain immigrants who are believed to be
in violation of non-criminal provisions of the federal immigration laws.”  Press Re-
lease, American Civil Liberties Union, Court Orders Attorney General to Disclose Se-
cret Memo on Local Police Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws (Sept. 27,
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=16566&c=
206. On September 24, 2004, a federal judge ordered that the Department of Justice
disclose the secret memorandum outlining the new policy.  Nat’l Council of La Raza
v. Dep’t of Justice, 339 F. Supp. 2d 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  The DOJ is appealing the
decision. See Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F. Supp. 2d 412
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Also see the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
(CLEAR) Act of 2003, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Homeland Security
Enhancement Act of 2003, S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003), which, if enacted, would have
required police to enforce federal immigration laws.
41 See, e.g., UNCONSTITUTIONAL: THE WAR ON OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES (Cinema Libre
2004).  Kathy Culliton, Legislative Staff Attorney for the Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, discusses the effects of state and local law enforcement of
immigration laws on crime victims and states: “Ashcroft’s directive that local police
enforce immigration law also means that if an immigrant witnesses a crime they will
now be afraid to come forward, fearing that they may be deported or even locked up
indefinitely.  That leaves criminals to run free on the streets, which is exactly why
police departments in Los Angeles and Seattle have policies not to enforce immigra-
tion law.” Id. See also GAIL PENDLETON & DAVID NEAL, ABA COMM’N ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS AND ITS EFFECTS OF VIC-
TIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/Ge-
tInvolved/Get%20Involved.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (discussing the chilling
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cious activity, and criminals will see them as easy prey . . . .”42
To check whether your state or locality has a formal policy re-
garding non-enforcement of immigration laws, the National Immi-
gration Law Center (NILC) has compiled an annotated chart of
Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enforce-
ment of Immigration Laws by Local Authorities.43  However, because
this is a contentious and rapidly developing issue in many commu-
nities, advocates should check for the most up-to-date information
with their state and local law enforcement officials.  If your state or
locality does not have such a policy, NILC has also produced Sample
Language for Policies Protecting Residents from Local Enforcement of Fed-
eral Immigration Laws.44
V. USING “THEFT OF SERVICE” LAWS: PROVING THE ELEMENTS OF
CRIMINAL “THEFT OF SERVICE”
In order to convict an employer of “theft of service” certain
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.45  A review of
such laws in all fifty states reveals that some common elements
must be proven.  Every state’s “theft of service” law includes some
form of intent requirement.46  In addition to intent, a number of
“theft of service” statutes require that the employer knew that the
services were only available for compensation.47  Still other states
effect that local police enforcement of immigration matters will have on crime
victims).
42 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, WHY Shouldn’t Local Police Enforce Federal Im-
migration Laws? (Jan. 28, 2004), at http://www.immigrationforum.org/DesktopDe-
fault.aspx?tabid=575.
43 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTI-
TUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL AU-
THORITIES, LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES (July 2004), at http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/.
44 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR POLICIES PROTECT-
ING RESIDENTS FROM LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (Nov.
2004), at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/sample%20policy_nov%20
2004.  In addition, possible approaches to solving this problem include “measures
protecting confidentiality . . . measures limiting the participation of city workers and
police in immigration enforcement and . . . measures opposing federal attempts to
require local police to cooperate with immigration law enforcement.” REBECCA SMITH
& AMY SUGIMORI, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, Low Pay, High Risk: State
Models for Advancing Immigrant Workers’ Rights ch. 2, 1 (2003), available at http://
www.nelp.org/publications.cfm?section=\Iwp\.
45 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects accused per-
sons against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime for which s/he is charged.
46 See supra note 4.
47 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802(A)(6) (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3211(c) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 845 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
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further require that the services were obtained by false representa-
tion, threat, deception, fraud, or other means to avoid payment.48
Regarding the intent requirement, generally speaking, an act
is a crime because the person committing it intended to do some-
thing that most people would consider wrong.  Thus, with very few
exceptions, to convict a person of a crime—an offense, a misde-
meanor, or a felony—a person must be found to have had the state
of mind to commit the crime.  This mental state is generally re-
ferred to as mens rea, Latin for “guilty mind.”49
When the definition of a crime requires not only doing an act,
but doing it with a specific intent or objective, as “theft of service”
laws do, the existence of the requisite mens rea can be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances or circumstantial evidence.  In the
wage theft context, evidence of an employer’s prior offenses, mis-
representations about payment, and intimidating statements or
threats are generally admissible to infer intent.50
However, some “theft of service” laws create a statutory pre-
sumption of intent after the happening of some event.  For example,
Nebraska’s law creates a presumption that the service was obtained
by deception as to intention to pay “[w]hen compensation for ser-
vice is ordinarily paid immediately upon the rendering of such ser-
vice” and a person refuses to pay or absconds without payment or
offer to pay.51  Similarly, North Dakota’s law establishes a presump-
tion of intent to deceive where a person absconds without payment
or making provision to pay “[w]here compensation for services is
ordinarily paid immediately upon their rendition, as in the case of
hotels, restaurants, and comparable establishments.”52 Texas’s
“theft of service” statute creates a presumption of “intent to avoid
payment” if the employer fails to pay a laborer within 10 days after
§ 514.060 (Michie 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 357 (West 2004); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:20-8 (West 2004).
48 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(1) (Michie 2002) (by deception, force,
threat, or other means to avoid payment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 2000) (by
any false or fraudulent representation or pretense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3704(a)
(1995) (“by deception, threat, coercion, stealth, tampering or use of false token or
device”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-8 (West 2004) (by deception, threat, or false
statements).
49 In the legal system’s eyes, people who intentionally engage in the behavior pro-
hibited by a law have “mens rea;” that is, they are morally blameworthy.  For example,
a murder law may prohibit “the intentional and unlawful killing of one human being
by another human being.”  Under such a law, one who intentionally and unlawfully
kills another person has “mens rea.”
50 See FED. R. EVID. 403, 404(b).
51 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-515(1) (1995).
52 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (1997).
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receiving a notice demanding payment.53  Unfortunately, an em-
ployer’s non-response to a demand letter does not create a statu-
tory presumption of intent in states other than Texas.  Regardless,
once the statutory presumption of intent is triggered, the employer
bears the burden of rebutting that presumption.
For workers and advocates, the key to successfully using “theft
of service” laws is to identify the elements of “theft of service” in the
state or locality, to be familiar with the requisite intent, and to un-
derstand the evidentiary burden of proving each element beyond a
reasonable doubt.
VI. ADVOCATING FOR “THEFT OF SERVICE” ORDINANCES AT THE
MUNICIPAL LEVEL
One of the benefits of using “theft of service” provisions is that
they already exist in most states.  However, in those states that do
not have such laws, it may be feasible and desirable to enact ordi-
nances at the municipal level.  For example, in early September
2004, advocates in Kansas City, Missouri who were inspired by
Equal Justice Center’s success in Austin, Texas pushed for and
passed Ordinance No. 040964 which expressly provides that “steal-
ing of a person’s labor violates this ordinance.”  The ordinance
states that “[a] person commits the ordinance violation of stealing
if he appropriates property or services of another with the purpose
to deprive him thereof, either without his consent or by means of
deceit.”  Moreover, the law defines services to include “labor for
wages.”54
Lynda Callon, a Community Coordinator for Westside Com-
munity Action Network Center, Inc. (Westside CAN), was instru-
mental in guiding the ordinance through the City’s Council.
Callon reports that Westside CAN and the police officers with
whom the organization works realized that unpaid wages was a
growing problem in the neighborhood.  Because of this, one of-
ficer spoke to a city prosecutor about the problem of unpaid wages.
That prosecutor directed the officer to contact the City Attorney,
Gaylen Beaufort.  The officer eventually convinced Mr. Beaufort
that the small claims process was too complex and convoluted for
many workers and that workers needed a different legal strategy.
Mr. Beaufort then approved a “theft of service” statute proposed by
53 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(b)(2) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005). See
infra Apps. A and B.
54 See App. D for full text of Kansas City ordinance.
2005] AN ADVOCATE’S TOOLKIT 297
Westside CAN.55
After the passage of the ordinance, Westside CAN planned to
hold a press conference with a city councilman in order to publi-
cize the new ordinance.  They also planned to meet with local
judges to explain the new law.  Westside CAN has forwarded the
ordinance to Kansas City Police Department’s Patrol Bureau Chief,
who has agreed to order training for police officers.56  Such munic-
ipal ordinances are being considered by advocates in other cities as
well.57
VII. IMPROVING WAGE THEFT LAWS: STRICT LIABILITY FOR
NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES
As discussed in Section V., what a defendant intended to do
often affects whether and how severely s/he will be punished.
However this is not always the case.  There are some crimes that do
not require mens rea.  These are called strict liability offenses.  One
way to improve wage theft laws would be by making them “strict
liability” crimes.  Since the outcome of unpaid wage cases hinges
on proving an employer’s intent, the difficulty of establishing such
cases would be obviated by eliminating intent as an element of the
offense.
The significance of a strict liability offense is that certain de-
fenses, such as mistake, are not available.58  This would be benefi-
cial in wage theft cases because a likely employer defense is
mistake.  Strict liability for non-payment of wages is not a radical
idea.  Connecticut currently has a labor law which makes an em-
ployer’s failure to pay wages a strict liability felony.59
55 Telephone Interview with Lynda Callon, Community Coordinator, Westside
CAN Center, Inc. (Sept. 13, 2004).
56 Telephone Interview with Lynda Callon, Community Coordinator, Westside
CAN (Oct. 11, 2004).
57 For example, in Denver, Colorado, El Centro Humanitario, a day laborers’
center, is developing a proposal for a “theft of service” ordinance.  Telephone Inter-
view with Minsun Ji, Executive Director, El Centro Humanitario para Los
Trabajadores (Sept. 29, 2004).
58 DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 156. See also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 1 WHARTON’S CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 78 (15th ed.).
59 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-71(a) provides:
Each employer, by himself, his agent or representative, shall pay weekly
all moneys due each employee on a regular pay day, designated in ad-
vance by the employer, in cash, by negotiable checks or, upon an em-
ployee’s written request, by credit to such employee’s account in any
bank which has agreed with the employer to accept such wage deposits.
See State v. Wilson, 848 A.2d 542 (2004) (holding that (1) failure to pay wages was a
strict liability crime that did not require proof of criminal negligence, and (2) statute
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The justification for a strict liability law is that the social bene-
fits of stringent enforcement outweigh the harm of punishing a
person who may be morally innocent.60  Because the consequences
of non-payment of wages are irrefutably and extraordinarily seri-
ous—impoverishment, and destruction of community and family—
advocates proposing a new law or an amendment to an existing law
can and should make a strong argument that such laws hold em-
ployers strictly liable for failing to pay workers.
VIII. CHECKLIST OF WHAT YOU NEED TO USE “THEFT OF
SERVICE” LAWS
• A State or Municipal “Theft of Service” Law.
• A Working Relationship with Local Police and Prosecutors.
• An Agreement, Policy or Law that Bans Police from Enforcing
Immigration Laws.
• An Explicit and Systematic Procedure for Police and Prosecu-
tors Handling “Theft of Service” Reports.
• An Internal System for Coordinating the Handling of such
Cases.
criminalizing failure to pay wages was not rendered unconstitutionally void for vague-
ness based on failure to contain mens rea element).  Although generally the penalty
imposed under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether
the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea (DRESSLER supra note 23,
at 161 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994)), the Connecticut
court still held that even a felony may be a strict liability crime.  “Neither the United
States Supreme Court nor our Supreme Court has held that the magnitude of the
penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes.” Id. (quoting State
v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656 (2000)).
60 Examples of strict liability laws include “statutory rape” laws which in some states
make it illegal to have sexual intercourse with a minor, even if the defendant reasona-
bly believed that the sexual partner was old enough to consent legally to sexual inter-
course, and “sale of alcohol to minors” laws that in many states punish store clerks
who sell alcohol to minors even if the clerks reasonably believe that the minors are
old enough to buy liquor.
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APPENDIX A:
TEXAS “THEFT OF SERVICE” STATUTE AND
INTENT CRITERIA
After one and a half years of discussion, an Austin task force
which included day laborers came up with the idea of using Texas’s
criminal “theft of service” law to enforce day laborers’ claims for
unpaid wages.61
Texas’s statute declares the following:
A person commits theft of service if, with intent to avoid payment
for service that he knows is provided only for compensation:
(1) he intentionally or knowingly secures performance of the
service by deception, threat, or false token;
. . .
(4) he intentionally or knowingly secures the performance of
the service by agreeing to provide compensation and, after the
service is rendered, fails to make payment after receiving notice
demanding payment.62
Although “intent to avoid payment” must ultimately be
proved, the law provides two factual scenarios after which it will be
presumed:
(1) the actor absconded without paying for the service or ex-
pressly refused to pay for the service in circumstances where pay-
ment is ordinarily made immediately upon rendering of the
service, as in hotels, campgrounds, recreational vehicle parks,
restaurants, and comparable establishments;
(2) the actor failed to make payment under a service agreement
within 10 days after receiving notice demanding payment.63
The task force discussed common non-payment scenarios and
developed additional criteria which would satisfy the “intent not to
pay” requirement.  The criteria are now included in the standard
operating procedure (SOP) for the Austin Police Department
(APD).  The SOP is the operations manual used by the entire po-
lice department.  It serves as a guide for the police in determining
whether to arrest, and makes the police more consistent and less
likely to arrest someone who could not be convicted.
The SOP currently provides that any of the following circum-
61 Telephone Interview with Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 26, 2004).
62 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(a) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005) (emphasis
added).
63 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005).
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stances can be considered as a showing of “intent not to pay” when
receiving a complaint regarding non-payment of day labor services:
(1) The business/individual has had 2 or more incidences64 of
failing to pay for services rendered (with the same or different
people); or
(2) The work agreement65 specifies that payment be made im-
mediately upon services rendered, and the business/individual
fails to tender payment to worker at that time; or
(3) The business/individual schedules a “pay day,” agreeing to
meet worker on a particular day, and fails to show up; or
(4) The business/individual indicates to a third party his/her
intent not to pay; or
(5) Payment is rendered with a check and that business/individ-
ual fails to make payment via one of the following scenarios:
(a) knowingly issues that check on a closed or nonexistent
account,
(b) stops payment on the check,
(c) after receiving notification of insufficient funds on the
check rendered, fails to tender payment within a reasonable
time period.66
In Austin, the procedure for enforcing “theft of service” claims
is as follows.  If one of the “intent not to pay” criteria is satisfied, an
advocate from CTIWoRC calls the employer to attempt to negoti-
ate by phone.  If negotiations are unsuccessful, an advocate then
sends a certified demand letter with return receipt notifying the
employer that wages are owed.67  Enclosed with the demand letter
is a memorandum from the Austin Police Department explaining
the “theft of service” law and the Department’s policy of enforcing
it.  The enclosure of the APD letter is designed to show employers
that the police are serious about enforcing the law.  The employer
then has ten days to pay the wages or an arrest warrant is filed with
the Austin Police Department.
64 This section is purposely vague in order to include both complaints and convic-
tions.  Workers’ previous complaints to CTIWoRC or the Mexican Consulate, even
those that did not result in any formal legal action, count as an incident.
65 The agreement may be oral or written.
66 E-mail from Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with
author).
67 Note that the Texas statute specifically provides that intent is presumed when
the employer fails to make payment after receiving notice demanding payment.  It
should be noted that in drafting a demand letter it is an ethical violation for an attor-
ney to use the criminal process to improve his client’s position in a civil matter.  Ac-
cordingly, such a letter must be carefully drafted. See infra note 69.
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If the employer does not pay or contact the CTIWoRC, then
the worker (with the guidance of CTIWoRC) calls 311 to file a
“theft of service” police report.  The individual filing the report
must provide (1) the first and last name, telephone number, and
physical address of the employer, and (2) the physical Austin ad-
dress where the work was performed or where the worker was
contracted.
The Austin Police Department SOP also sets out the following
additional criteria that “should be met” when investigating and
eventually filing charges for Theft of Service/Wage Claims:
(1) Some aspect of the offense occurred within the city limits of
Austin which include one of the following scenarios:
(a) the business is located in Austin,
(b) the work was performed in Austin,
(c) the worker was picked up/contracted in Austin and work
completed outside the city;
(2) An agreement for work was reached either orally or in writ-
ing and payment was not rendered for the services contracted
for by that agreement;
(3) Attempts were made by the victim/representing organiza-
tion/detective to resolve the situation by contacting the business
or individual employer;
(4) A demand letter has been mailed by certified mail request-
ing payment for services rendered with return receipt
requested;
(5) Intent to avoid payment is presumed if the business or indi-
vidual employer fails to make payment under a service agree-
ment within 10 days after receiving notice demanding return;
(6) It is presumed that written notice was received not later than
5 days after demand letter was sent;
(7) If the certified letter is returned unopened to the sender,
the letter will serve as evidence of attempt to request payment,
so long as it was sent to the last known address of the business or
individual employer;
(8) A sworn statement is obtained from the victim, or a sworn
statement is obtained from the victim and presented by an indi-
vidual acting as the liaison;
(9) The victim correctly identifies the employer from a photo-
graph-based lineup.68
68 E-mail from Julien Ross, Coordinator, CTIWoRC (Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with
author).
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APPENDIX B:
TEXAS DEMAND LETTER69
Re:  Demand for unpaid wages/theft of service.
Sent by certified mail
Dear Mr./Ms. Employer:
The Central Texas Immigrant Worker Rights Center is a non-profit
law office that assists low-income workers.  We are writing you on
behalf of Mr./Ms. Worker, who worked for you between months of
year. Mr./Ms. Worker claims that he/she is owed $ amount in unpaid
wages for type of work performed for you. Mr./Ms. Worker has
presented to us a detailed calculation of the dates and hours
worked, the salary promised, and the amount of outstanding wages
owed.
This letter is a demand for payment of the $ amount in unpaid
wages. Failure to pay the $ amount within ten days of receiving this
letter creates a presumption of committing an offense, and this
matter will be referred to the Austin Police Department.  The Aus-
tin Police Department is investigating such cases under criminal
Theft of Service charges, pursuant to Chapter 31.04 of the Texas
Penal Code (see attached Police memo).
It is always our policy to attempt to settle this type of dispute
through negotiation.  We attempted to resolve this with you by tele-
phone and were unsuccessful.  Please contact us immediately if you
wish to settle this matter or if you have any questions: Tel: 512-474-
0007, ext. 102; Fax: 512-474-0008.  To resolve this matter immedi-
ately, send payment of $ amount made out to “Equal Justice Center
Trust Account” within 10 days of receiving this letter to:  Equal Jus-
tice Center; 510 S. Congress Ave.; Suite 206; Austin, TX  78704.
We will not distribute the funds to Mr./Ms. Worker until they have
signed a release form.
69 This is letter included with the permission of Julien Ross, Coordinator,
CTIWoRC.  Please note that Texas is the only state in which a non-response to a
demand letter creates a presumption of “intent to avoid payment.”  See supra Section
V. State rules of professional conduct, which govern the conduct of lawyers, generally
prohibit lawyers from presenting and threatening presentation of criminal charges
when the purpose is to affect the resolution of a civil dispute. Gregory G. Sarno,
Annotation, Initiating, or Threatening to Initiate, Criminal Prosecution as Grounds for
Disciplining Counsel, 42 ALR 4th 1000, 1017 (1985).  Thus, if a lawyer were to send a
letter to an employer expressing a conditional intent to file a criminal complaint, or
even if a lawyer were to send a letter arguing that an employer’s conduct violated a
criminal law and asking for an explanation or justification of the conduct, the lawyer
would have to be very careful to word the letter so that s/he does not violate the
disciplinary rules of the particular state.
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Please be advised that it is illegal to retaliate or take any adverse
action with respect to Mr./Ms. Worker.
Thank you for your attention to this matter and I hope to hear
from you soon.
304 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:283
APPENDIX C:
SAMPLE “THEFT OF SERVICE” INTAKE FORM/AFFIDAVIT70
Recuperación de Salario Atrasado/Wage Claim Form
Case Contact Person: 
Date Received: 
Date Closed: 
1. INFORMACIÓN DEL TRABAJADOR/A Case #
Nombre/Name
Lugar de nacimiento/Place of Birth
Fecha de nacimiento/D.O.B.
Número de Teléfono Local/Local Telephone Number
Dirección Local/Local Address 
Código/ Zip Code
Número de Teléfono Permanente/Permanent Telephone
Dirección Permanente/Permanent Address
Contacto en caso de Emergencia/Emergency Contact
¿Que idioma(s) habla Usted?/ What Language(s) do you Speak? 
2. INFORMACIÓN DEL EMPLEADOR (Patrón)
Nombre del Patrón ó Supervisor/Employer’s or Supervisor’s name
Nombre de la compañia/Company name
Dirección/Address
Código Postal/Zip Code
Teléfono (s)/ Telephone Number (s)
70 This form is included with the permission of Julien Ross, Coordinator,
CTIWoRC. See also NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, PROTECTING YOUR RIGHT TO
BE PAID (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/pub107%2Epdf.
This New York fact sheet for workers shares record-keeping strategies for successful
enforcement of unpaid wage claims. Id.
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Número de placas y descripción del vehı́culo/License Plate & Ve-
hicle Description
Descripción  del Trabajo/Work Description
Lugar donde se realizó el trabajo/Address Where Work was Per-
formed
Qué idioma habla su patrón?/What Language Does your Employer
Speak?
Otra compania contrató a su patrón? Quien?/Who Contracted your
Employer?
Fechas Salario Horas ó Dı́as
Trabajadas Prometido Trabajadas Salario Recibido Salario Debido
Total Hours/Days
Dates Worked Salary Promised Worked Salary Received Amount Owed
*¿El acuerdo ó contrato con su patrón fué verbal ó escrito? (Ver-
bal or written agreement/contract?)
*¿Dónde/Cómo conoció al empleador? (Where/How did you meet
the employer?)
*¿El patrón le dió alguna razón para no pagarle? Qué razón?
(Did employer give you a reason not to pay? If so, what?)
*¿Supervisó ó empleó a otros trabajadores? (Did client supervise/hire other
workers?)
Sı́  No
*¿Si respondó “Si”, quién le pagó a los trabajadores? (If so, who
paid the workers?)
*¿Ha tratado de negociar con el patrón? ¿Cuántas veces? ¿Qué ha
dicho?
(Have you tried negotiating? How many times? What did the employer
say?) 
*¿Conoce a otros trabajadores del mismo patrón a quienes no se les ha
pagado?  Nombres/teléfonos? (Other victims of the same employer?
Names/ telephones?)
*¿Su patró le ha amenazado ó tratado con agressión? ¿En qué
forma?
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(Has the employer threatened you or acted with aggression? How?)
*¿Cómo supo del Centro de Apoyo? (How did you find out about
us?)
Yo, , doy fé que esta información es cierta.
(I affirm that this information is correct.)
Firma del trabajador(a)/Signature Fecha/ Date
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Resumen del Caso (Case Summary)
Nombre del Trabajador(a) 
Nombre del Patrón(a) 
ESCRIBA ABAJO UNA BREVE DESCRIPCIÓN DE LO QUE PASÓ EN EL CASO.
(Write below a brief description of what happened in your case).
Yo,  doy fé que esta información es cierta.
Firma del trabajador  Fecha 
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Cálculo de dı́as trabajados y salarios no pagados
Nombre del Trabajador(a) 




Total deberian Salario total que
Fechas Hora de Hora de Hora de Horas haber pagado y se le
trabajadas entrada comida salida Trabajadas pagado) la fecha debe.
Yo,  doy fé que esta información es cierta.
Firma del trabajador  Fecha 
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APPENDIX D:
KANSAS CITY WAGE THEFT ORDINANCE
Ordinance No. 040964
Amending Chapter 50, Code of Ordinances, by repealing Section
50-106, Stealing, and enacting in lieu thereof one new section of
like number and subject.
WHEREAS, currently Section 50-106, Stealing, Code of Ordi-
nances, does not expressly provide that the stealing of a person’s
labor violates this ordinance; and
WHEREAS, the stealing of a person’s labor by means of deceit is a
growing problem in parts of the City; NOW, THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF KANSAS CITY:
Section 1. That Chapter 50, Code of Ordinances of the City of Kan-
sas City, Missouri, is hereby amended by repealing Section 50-106,
Stealing, and enacting in lieu thereof a new section of like number
and subject, to read as follows:
Sec. 50-106. Stealing.
(a) Definitions. The following words, terms and phrases, when
used in this section, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in
this subsection, except where the context clearly indicates a differ-
ent meaning:
(1) Appropriate means to take, obtain, use, transfer, conceal or
retain possession of.
(2) Credit device means a writing, number or other device pur-
porting to evidence an undertaking to pay for property or services
delivered or rendered to or upon the order of a designated person
or bearer.
(3) Deceit means purposely making a representation which is false
and which the actor does not believe to be true and upon which
the victim relies, as to a matter of fact, law, value, intention or
other state of mind. The term “deceit” does not, however, include
falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group ad-
dressed. Deception as to the actor’s intention to perform a promise
shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subse-
quently perform the promise.
(4) Deprive means to:
a. Withhold property from the owner permanently;
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b. Restore property only upon payment of reward or other
compensation;
c. Use or dispose of property in a manner that makes recovery
of the property by the owner unlikely; or
d. Refuse or fail to pay for labor for wages or services provided
by an individual natural person pursuant to an agreement.
(5) Of another. Property or services is that “of another” if any natu-
ral person, corporation, partnership, association, governmental
subdivision or instrumentality, other than the actor, has a posses-
sory or proprietary interest therein, except that property shall not
be deemed property of another who has only a security interest
therein, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a condi-
tional sales contract or other security arrangement.
(6) Property means anything or value, whether real or personal,
tangible or intangible, in possession or in action, and shall include
but not be limited to the evidence of a debt actually executed but
not delivered or issued as a valid instrument.
(7) Receiving means acquiring possession, control or title or lend-
ing on the security of the property.
(8) Services includes labor for wages, transportation, telephone,
electricity, gas, water or other public service, accommodation in
hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions and use
of vehicles.
(9) Writing includes printing, any other method of recording in-
formation, money, coins, negotiable instruments, tokens, stamps,
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege or identification.
(b) A person commits the ordinance violation of stealing if he ap-
propriates property or services of another with the purpose to de-
prive him thereof, either without his consent or by means of deceit.
(c) Evidence of the following is admissible in any criminal prosecu-
tion under this section on the issue of the requisite knowledge of
belief of the alleged stealer:
(1) That he failed or refused to pay for property or services of a
hotel, restaurant, inn or boardinghouse.
(2) That he left the hotel, restaurant, inn or boardinghouse with
the intent not to pay for property or services.
(3) That he surreptitiously removed or attempted to remove his
baggage from a hotel, inn or boardinghouse.
